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The global smallpox program is generally
presented as the brainchild of a handful of
actors from the WHO headquarters in Geneva
and at the agency’s regional offices. This
article attempts to present a more complex
description of the drive to eradicate smallpox.
Based on the example of India, a major focus
of the campaign, it is argued that historians
and public health officials should recognize
the varying roles played by a much wider
range of participants. Highlighting the
significance of both Indian and international
field officials, the author shows how
bureaucrats and politicians at different levels
of administration and society managed to
strengthen—yet sometimes weaken—
important program components. Centrally
dictated strategies developed at WHO offices
in Geneva and New Delhi, often in
association with Indian federal authorities,
were reinterpreted by many actors and
sometimes changed beyond recognition.
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O programa global de erradicação da varíola
geralmente é apresentado como obra de um
punhado de atores baseados no quartel-general da
Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS), em
Genebra, Suíça, e em seus vários escritórios
regionais. Este artigo apresenta descrição mais
complexa do esforço para erradicar a varíola.
Tomando como exemplo a Índia, um dos
principais alvos da campanha, mostra que é
importante reconhecer os variados papéis
desempenhados por leque muito mais variado de
participantes. Sem  subestimar os funcionários que
foram a campo, o autor analisa a atuação de
burocratas e políticos em diferentes níveis da
administração e da sociedade. Fica claro que
foram capazes de fortalecer e, às vezes, também,
solapar importantes componentes do programa.
Desse modo, estratégias concebidas nos núcleos
centrais da OMS, em Genebra e Nova Délhi, com
freqüência envolvendo autoridades federais
indianas, foram reinterpretadas por muitos atores
e por vezes modificadas a ponto de se tornarem
irreconhecíveis.
KEYWORDS: erradicação da varíola; Índia;
Organização Mundial da Saúde; atenção
primária à saúde.
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The eradication of smallpox in India would not have beenpossible but for the contributions of many actors. The World
Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland,
and its South East Asia Regional Office (Searo), based in New Delhi,
India, played an extremely prominent role. So did the health
ministries of the Indian central government and state governments.
All these agencies set up a series of special ‘eradication units’, which
deployed several energetic medical and public health personnel all
over the sub-continent. The Soviet Union, the United States of
America, Sweden and a host of other Asian and European countries
provided generous doses of aid, often on a bilateral basis, in the
form of field operatives, vaccine, operating kits and money. Indian
and international charitable institutions made significant contri-
butions at crucial junctures as well.1
The involvement of such a great variety of workers is un-
surprising considering how complicated the organization of the
final stages of Indian smallpox eradication campaign turned out
to be. The country was huge, with stretches of extremely difficult
terrain, often with no access to transportation links. The topo-
graphy was varied and specific campaign methods had to be
organized for each territorial context. Linguistic and cultural
diversities were as varied. More than twenty major languages and
several local dialects were spoken, and a wide variety of religious
traditions and class configurations were visible in the localities of
each Indian state. The administrative challenges did not end there.
Many sections of the Indian population were not only often
uncooperative, but also frequently openly hostile to the quest for
smallpox eradication.
Even though commentaries about smallpox eradication in India
frequently disagree about the value of the contributions of parti-
cular players, there is a uniformly celebratory element, which was
particularly noticeable in publicity documents, official histories and
memoirs. These generally also present a simplified picture of a unified
campaign workforce, supposedly confident about its goals and
consistently effective in the field due to its educational and technical
expertise. A prime example of this is provided in the foreword
written by Donald Henderson, the inspirational chief of the special
Smallpox Eradication Unit set up within the World Health
Organization Headquarters (WHO HQ) in Geneva, in the
organization’s official history of the eradication program. He de-
clares in it that: “One of the most gratifying features of this program
is the unified and effective way in which the Government of India
and the World Health Organization have collaborated. At every
level, national and WHO staff worked shoulder to shoulder,
pursuing their goal with technical competence, dedication and
enthusiasm” (Basu, Jezek, Ward, 1979).
1 The WHO’s official
history of the last
phase of the smallpox
eradication program
provides a detailed list
of the international
and Indian
epidemiologists
deployed in the sub-
continent (see Basu,
Jezek, Ward, 1979).
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, unpublished WHO and Government
of India correspondence reveals a far more complex picture. Agen-
cies sponsored by the WHO and the Indian government were often
at loggerheads on matters of strategy in particular situations, which
shows that neither administrative organization was monolithic
in nature. Moreover, many officials, of different nationalities and
ranks, remained skeptical about the possibility of expunging variola
from the sub-continent. This even included some of the campaign’s
staunchest supporters within the WHO, who often privately
queried many of the successes claimed in relation to the dramatic
reduction of the incidence of the disease in the early 1970s.
Despite their ability to provide a more nuanced understanding
of the final chapters of one of the most important international
health programs in the twentieth century, these administrative
complexities are often ignored.2 This article attempts to show why
it would be profitable not to do so.
A troubled advance: the creation of the infrastructure for
eradication
The WHO Health Assembly’s repeated calls in the 1950s for
smallpox eradication caused a lot of international attention to be
focused at India, as it was a major reservoir of the disease (see
Table 1, below). This critical gaze made several senior members of
India’s central government, including Jawaharlal Nehru, the Pri-
me Minister, extremely uneasy. The widespread incidence of variola
was considered by this modernizing crusader, with a keen sense of
how India was perceived on the international stage, as a stigma,
as a sign that his regime’s agenda of rapid reform and development
was unfolding far less effectively than planned.3 Considering the
fact that the Prime Minister was the chief executive authority in
the country (the Indian President, who was elected by two houses
of parliament, was merely a figurehead), Nehru’s views ensured
action from within the confines of the federal Ministry of Health.
This took the shape of the appointment of a so-called ‘Central Expert
Committee’ in May 1958, which was asked to put forward proposals
about the best means of eradicating variola.
In many ways, however, this was a rather limited exercise–
setting up a committee was one thing, getting policies enacted and
bureaucratic and civilian support was quite another issue. Prime
Ministerial authority at this time was relatively slight, where state-
level politicians and bureaucrats were allowed significant levels of
autonomy. Moreover, there was political hostility to the proposal
for an organized smallpox eradication program. Even Nehru,
widely regarded as a charming negotiator with a knack for rallying
wide-ranging political support on the domestic front, found it
2 The result is the
presentation of huge
generalizations about
the structures and
goals of the World
Health Organization
and the smallpox
eradication
bureaucracy it helped
set up (see, for
instance, Naraindas,
1998, p.94, footnote
21).
3 See, for instance,
speech by Jawaharlal
Nehru about the
importance of
smallpox eradication
reproduced in
Government of India,
1966, p.1.
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extremely difficult to get rid of opposition from senior bureaucrats
within the federal-and state-level health ministries, which were
reported as being deeply divided about the issue (Government of
India, 1964, p.25).
Senior WHO officials in Geneva were well aware of these
administrative divisions, at each level of Indian government. Despite
this, they developed plans for eradication for India, on the assumption
that bureaucratic and political opposition in the country would
ultimately be overcome with the support of senior members of the
central government. This assessment was powerfully underlined by
Year India World India/World Percentage
1950 157,487 332,224 47.4
1951 253,332 485,942 52.1
1952 74,836 155,609 48.1
1953 37,311 90,768 41.1
1954 46,619 97,731 47.7
1955 41,887 87,743 47.7
1956 45,109 92,164 48.9
1957 78,666 156,404 50.3
1958 168,216 278,922 60.3
1959 47,109 94,603 50.4
1960 31,091 65,737 47.3
1961 45,380 88,730 51.3
1962 55,595 98,700 56.3
1963 83,423 133,003 62.7
1964 41,160 75,910 54.2
1965 33,402 112,703 29.8
1966 32,616 92,620 35.2
1967 83,943 131,418 63.9
1968 30,925 80,213 37.8
1969 19,139 52,204 35.3
1970 12,341 33,663 36.7
1971 16,166 52,794 30.6
1972 20,407 65,153 31.3
1973 88,109 135,851 64.9
1974 188,003 218,364 86.1
1975 1,436 19,278 7.5
1976 Zero 953 —
1977 Zero 3,234 —
Table 1: Smallpox cases in India and the world, 1950-1977
Source: Basu, Jezek, Ward, 1979, p.36.
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the presentation of a ‘Smallpox Eradication Criterion’ in August
1961 (Bonne, Aug. 8, 1961). Strikingly, this prescription proved
unpopular within the headquarters of WHO’s Searo. They
demanded changes in the statement released from Geneva, which
were considered necessary for reasons presented as being locally
pertinent (Memorandum...,  Aug. 18, 1961). Although this reminder
of organizational disunity irritated the WHO HQ, its officials were
forced nevertheless to provide a written reassurance to New Delhi
that local epidemiological and infrastructural factors would be
considered during the planning and running of an Indian
eradication program (Bonne, Sept. 14, 1961).
The wisdom of developing regionally relevant policy was
underlined very quickly. Even as pilot smallpox eradication schemes
were started in one district of each of the twenty-two Indian states
during the course of 1960, the damaging effects of local infra-
structural constraints and bureaucratic disinterest became starkly
obvious. The deployment of all the pilot projects, which were
intended to introduce a hundred per cent vaccinal coverage, was
delayed everywhere, causing much publicized WHO and central
targets to be missed. Worryingly for the federal Health Ministry,
these setbacks appeared as other disease eradication and control
programs began to hit stormy waters and just as their managers
started demanding greater chunks of central government
allocations (the flagging National Malaria Eradication Program
was a good case in point, as was the troubled drive for TB control).4
These difficulties ensured that the structures supporting the
National Smallpox Eradication Program developed far more slowly
than many WHO officials had hoped. The initial burst of growth
was limited to the development of a new central nodal organization
based in New Delhi and this was accompanied by a round of reform
of local administrative rules seeking to make state-level public health
officials more answerable to their superiors in New Delhi.5 Despite
this, smallpox eradication work in the states was dogged by delays
and this situation was justified by persistent references to financial
difficulties (Report 1961-62, 1964, p.19).
While central government financial assistance allowed the
completion of most of the state-level pilot schemes, several senior
central government observers were very disheartened by the
administrative difficulties that had been thrown up in almost every
context. Indeed, unpublished correspondence from the second half
of the 1960s shows that many powerful administrators considered
this proof of the impossibility of expunging variola and began to
develop plans for cutting back the National Smallpox Eradication
Program budget. News of these developments set alarm bells
ringing throughout the WHO, causing Donald Henderson to
personally approach the Director General of Indian Health Services
4 See, for instance,
Report 1961-62 (1964).
5 See, for instance,
circular letter from
Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Health and
Family Planning,
Government of India,
to Public Health
Departments of all
state governments,
January 3, 1962,
reproduced in
Government of India,
1966, p.20-23.
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6 See, for instance,
Payne, Apr. 4, 1967.
7 See, for example,
Mani, May 2, 1967.
in February 1967. His aim, which seems to have had widespread
support in Geneva, was to ensure that the Indian government
continued to back the eradication goal, albeit on a new basis.
Henderson suggested that all aspects of the sub-continental
campaign be thoroughly reformed. This was, interestingly, to not
only involve governmental structures, but also include the relevant
departments of the WHO’s Searo; senior WHO representatives
seemed to consider it politic to accept part of the blame for the
problems that were continuing to hound smallpox immunization
work in India (Henderson, Feb. 21, 1967).
Henderson’s intervention seems to have been timely, even though
he appears to have been uncertain initially about the effectiveness
of his efforts and of the public declarations of support for the Indian
government made by the WHO HQ.6 One of his letters to the Ame-
rican Embassy in New Delhi reported, for instance, that the Indian
administrators were giving mixed messages and that Geneva had
no clear idea whether the sub-continental campaign would survive
the year (Henderson, Apr. 12, 1967). He need not have worried.
The promises of additional aid caused the Indian federal authorities
to reconsider their plans of scaling back their anti-smallpox
measures and led to what was widely regarded as a helpful re-
shuffle of bureaucrats within the central health ministry department
charged with the responsibility for coordcoordinating the
eradication program.7
Expansion, re-organization and re-deployment: Indian
smallpox eradication programs, 1967-1980
The developments of 1967 brought about a major shift in the
organization of the sub-continental smallpox eradication program.
It is important to remember, however, that this was not just a
result of the WHO decision to embark on a worldwide campaign
of mass immunization. The changes initiated in Geneva and New
Delhi from the month of April onwards were a direct response to
the threat of withdrawal of the Indian government’s support, and
these brought forth heightened levels of WHO assistance. The
organization’s willingness to commit extra resources did, of course,
have certain advantages for the managers of its smallpox eradication
units: they were able to extract the Indian Prime Minister’s
permission to launch a mass immunization drive in the sub-
continent, with both sides agreeing that this work would be
conducted in collaboration with federal health ministry officials.
The new plans of action were, therefore, a result of the coming
together of the strategic needs of both parties.
The WHO HQ attempted to kick-start the goal of achieving
countrywide mass vaccination by the employment of large numbers
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of foreign workers; as per agreement, they were expected to work
with the local bureaucrats. Geneva also arranged for the re-
organization of the smallpox eradication unit attached to the Searo.
Once again, this was achieved by the involvement of numerous
foreign workers, with experience in managing public health
projects, on a variety of short-term contracts. But a variety of
problems cropped up. For one, it was difficult to find sufficient
numbers of foreign staff; Henderson found it difficult to convince
the US government and universities to provide experienced
consultants at this time (Henderson,  Sept. 6, 1967). Additionally,
the WHO offices in Geneva and New Delhi had to get the
international workers available for work in the sub-continent
cleared by the Indian authorities, which was not easily achieved.
References to friction between short-term WHO consultants, officials
working on long-term contracts for the Searo and Indian bureaucrats
was a common refrain in reports (Maltseva, Jun. 27, 1967).
All these problems combined to reduce the effectiveness of the
mass vaccination drives launched in 1968; the continuing shortages
of efficacious freeze-dried vaccine and operating kits did not help
either. As a result, despite what the Indian government described
as ‘gigantic and concentrated’ efforts to reformulate immunization
policy between 1968 and 1970, the incidence of smallpox remained
high. These circumstances exacerbated tensions between the
eradication units run by the WHO and the Indian health ministry,
as officials blamed each others’ tactics. Henderson, for instance,
referred to the problems existing between the ‘various warring
factions within the Ministry and between the Ministry and the
States’ (Henderson, Sept. 14, 1970).
At another level, though, the high incidence of variola
encouraged the formation of new alliances. This involved workers
and bureaucrats who supported a shift from the goal of mass
vaccination, to a new strategy of ‘surveillance-containment’, based
on the isolation of infected people and selective vaccination of
smallpox stricken- communities and ‘rings’ of contacts (immediate
contacts targeted first, after which the scope of vaccination increased
to cover a broader range of potential contacts).8 These views did
not, of course, go unchallenged. Reports frequently mentioned how
variola outbreaks in the districts could throw carefully laid plans
for surveillance-containment out of gear in a situation where local
bureaucrats frequently reverted to the strategy of mass vaccination.9
In the light of such administrative challenges, the managers of
the WHO’s smallpox eradication units in Geneva and Delhi made
concerted efforts to gain the Indian central government’s help in
bringing hostile members of the federal and state health ministries
and local bureaucrats into line. While published reports and official
accounts of the eradication campaign are mostly silent about this
8 For a reference to
this, see Henderson,
May 12, 1970.
9 See, for instance,
Henderson, Jun. 28,
1971.
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tactical shift, unpublished correspondence reveals how important
it was considered by a range of senior WHO officials. It was not
enough to have the stated support of the central authorities; it
was now recognized that it was important formally to involve the
federal government in mobilizing local political and bureaucratic
support. Needless to say, this strategy of using central government
assistance to bring state employees into line was neither easy nor
always successful. Such high-level political support was inconstant
and needed periodic renewal. The genius of Nicole Grasset – an
inspirational French official employed by the WHO Searo HQ –
and Henderson lay in their ability to make this possible through
lobbying exercises, which were at times based on the unconventional
tactic of approaching Indira Gandhi, the powerful Indian prime
minister, directly, sometimes in violation of diplomatic protocols.
Gandhi’s support was significant, as she was actively involved in
centralizing power and was in a position to force relatively
compliant State Chief Ministers to support, at least publicly, specific
immunization campaigns (Grasset, Sept. 15, 1972).
A good instance of this was provided in 1972, a year considered
crucial within the WHO and the federal government (they believed
that a concerted search of certain states was necessary at this time
if eradication was to be achieved in India) (Grasset, Sept. 14, 1972).
Central government co-operation, stoked in no small degree by
support from the Prime Minister’s office, caused the so-called
‘smallpox endemic states’, like Jammu and Kashmir and Bihar, to
be searched intensively (Singh, c.1973, p.1; Pifer, c.1971, p.11-12).
As a direct result, thorough surveillance-containment efforts, more
rigorous than at any time in the past, were launched. Work was
often conducted on a systematic, door-to-door basis, particularly
in areas where smallpox outbreaks were confirmed; the policy was
effective and even the most demanding assessments accepted that
by late 1972, smallpox was only endemic in the four contiguous
states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh
(Henderson, Sept. 26, 1972).
It has to be said, however, that this success in limiting the scope
of variola in India surprised many, both within the WHO and
Indian government, and questions were raised by those hostile to
the eradication program about the reliability of the data being
presented. Nevertheless, this reduction in the area of smallpox
endemicity was seen as a major advance, so much so that the WHO
began negotiations for the launch of an even more concentrated
program of action, targeted primarily at the remaining pockets of
variola. Based on an offer of even greater levels of financial and
infrastructural assistance, these deliberations were successful and the
so-called intensified smallpox eradication program was launched
in 1973. Grasset and Henderson played an important role in
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negotiations with international financial donors–special funds
were, for instance, made available after considerable efforts on their
part by the Swedish International Development Agency (Jungalwalla,
Dec. 12, 1973).
Despite the deployment of unprecedented levels of financial and
technical resources, difficulties began to show up almost
immediately in the running of the intensified program. Reports of
numerous cases of bureaucratic opposition in the states, districts
and sub-divisions threatened to sour the spirit of co-operation that
appears to have developed amongst at least some senior WHO and
Indian government officials. Faced with recurrent smallpox
outbreaks across eastern India, accusations of inefficiency,
impropriety and lack of commitment began to be traded in meetings
and correspondence (Henderson, Mar. 5, 1973). Grasset felt, for
example, that problems were being created by officials at the level
of state governments. She accused their officials of playing a double
game, publicly promising help to the federal health ministry’s and
the WHO’s smallpox eradication departments, but remaining non-
committal in private (Grasset, June 7, 1973). Senior WHO officials,
therefore, began to push the Indian government, from 1974
onwards, to convert the intensified program into a centrally
controlled campaign, one that was politically supported by the
Prime Minister’s office and run by the federal health ministry’s
smallpox eradication department.10
Yet this aim was not easily achieved in a situation where the
Indian Prime Minister’s support fluctuated over time for reasons
that are impossible to identify definitively. The important point,
though, is that her commitment to the eradication goal varied,
which kept senior WHO and Indian government officials supportive
of smallpox eradication on the defensive. Indira Gandhi would
sometimes fully endorse the aims of campaign, release statements
to that effect, and allow the WHO officials to distribute copies of
these during their tours in the states.11 She would also sometimes
force senior state officials – the Chief Ministers and Health Ministers
– to show similar levels of support.12
On other occasions, though, this encouragement appeared to
all but evaporate. At one point, for instance, the federal Health
Minister was permitted, almost at a whim, to freeze the number of
international staff the WHO could deploy. The pressures imposed
on state level workers to co-operate with WHO teams were often
taken off at such moments; the hostility of several senior ministry
officials to colleagues working within the smallpox eradication
department which had close links with Grasset’s and Henderson’s
offices contributed to these trends as well. Such patterns of inaction
and hostility could prove to be administratively problematic. Apart
from allowing the under-reporting of variola cases, it created a
10 For examples of
such official trends,
see File 830, Box 194,
WHO/SEP.
11 See, for example,
Indira Gandhi’s
October 1974
statement and the
publications released
in support by state-
level officials, File
832, Box 197, WHO/
SEP.
12 Ibid.
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13 For a good
description of the
experiences of
American workers in
South Asia, see
Greenough, 1995.
situation where surveillance-containment operations were
mishandled; local workers would often carry out mass-vaccinations
over a limited area of about a five-mile radius, without any attention
given to people at a high risk of infection. Workers often failed to
detect people who were away from home and possibly carrying
smallpox between villages. And district officials seeking to justify
their inability to meet vaccination targets frequently exaggerated
vaccination refusal rates (Review..., c.1974, p.1-4).
Thus, the Indian government’s acceptance of the proposal,
around the middle of 1974, that the running of the intensified
program be fully centralized was widely celebrated within the WHO
offices in Geneva and New Delhi, not least because it formally
offered their smallpox eradication units the option of working in
an organized manner with the federal health ministry. The officials
attached to these agencies were now going to be allowed access to
a centralized fund, built up with contributions from a range of
donors and held in Geneva. These developments also allowed the
creation of a new, well-organized program bureaucracy, which was
distinct from the workforce attached to other disease control
programs run by the federal and state health ministries. This
bureaucracy was to be varied in composition, based not only on
workers from the United States, Western and Eastern Europe and
Asia (the Centers of Disease Control in the USA and the Soviet
Academy of Sciences contributed several consultants to the WHO),
but also the employment of local bureaucrats, Indian private medical
practitioners and medical students from sub-continental colleges,
who were placed on a variety of short-term contracts.13
Increased financial and infrastructural input did not automatically
translate into success. The centrally controlled intensified smallpox
eradication program was not always able to attract the support of
local administrative networks and operate without impediment.
The special status accorded to the campaign and its workforce often
made it deeply unpopular amongst sections of the Indian central
and state government. This even included elements within the fe-
deral health ministry, who continued to undermine the intensified
program. A dramatic example was Dr. J.B. Shrivastav, the Director
General of Health Services, the senior-most bureaucrat within the
federal health ministry. Dr. Mahendra Dutta, a senior member of
the ministry’s smallpox eradication department, noted that
Shrivastav began to question the surveillance-containment policy
at a time that this was considered crucial. Presenting himself as a
supporter of the policy of 100 per cent vaccinal coverage, he began
distributing warnings about the dangers arising from the
development of a ‘vaccination backlog’. This created doubts
amongst more junior state- and district-level officials, who began
to worry about what would happen to their career prospects if
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they were found to be ignoring the views of Shrivastav and his
allies. They often tended, as a result, to be less than co-operative to
the smallpox eradication teams (Dutta, c.1980, p.9; Mar. 3, 1999).
The problems did not end here. At the same time, certain state
administrators began to demand that workers attached to other
vertical public health programs and the health centers return to
their original duties, rather than buttress the intensified program.
Indeed, WHO officials soon found themselves competing for
resources with family planning schemes launched by the central
and state health ministries due to pressures imposed by Sanjay
Gandhi, the Prime Minister’s politically powerful son (Dutta, c. 1980,
p.13). Senior WHO officials, like Grasset and Henderson, tried to
lighten the impact of these developments by directing diplomatic
initiatives at the Prime Minister’s Office, the State Chief Ministers,
and the federal and state health ministries. However, only some of
these efforts proved successful; the intensified eradication program
moved ahead in fits and starts during the course of 1974 (Grasset,
c. Sept. 1974).
Nevertheless, efforts at strengthening the program continued
apace right through 1975. This took several forms: more foreign
consultants were brought in from a variety of countries, greater
numbers of local workers were contracted on a temporary basis
with funds held at the WHO HQ, and the support of senior
politicians and bureaucrats was lobbied continuously. These efforts
paid off; eastern India was systematically and intensively searched
for variola pockets, leading to the discovery of several cases in
January that year. While the month had started off well, with less
than 100 outbreaks being reported throughout the country in the
first two weeks, a search carried out by a team led by Dr. R.B.
Arnold, a CDC epidemiologist posted to Nalanda, Bihar, revealed
a large cluster of new cases at Pawa Puri village. The situation was
complicated by the fact that several hundred Jain pilgrims – a
religious community averse to vaccination – were visiting the village
on a daily basis (Dutta, c.1980, p.9-11).
Ironically, however, this outbreak proved useful to the program
managers. Reference to the crisis allowed them to reinvigorate
support for eradication, as several senior politicians and
bureaucrats were reminded that the battle against variola was far
from won. This event also allowed Grasset and Henderson, and
their allies within the federal health ministry, to get the Prime
Minister’s ear, in a situation where she did not want her regime to
be identified with the failure of a global program. Her office began
involving itself in bringing the Congress-run state ministries into
line. The benefits of such trends were clearly visible in the weeks
following the Bihar outbreak. Even though several ministerial
employees and civil servants doubted that variola could be expunged
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16 See, for instance,
Henderson, Nov. 3,
1975.
15 Singh’s TV
broadcast was
immediately – and
widely – reported in
the Indian press (see,
for example, Smallpox
wiped..., July 1, 1975;
Small-pox
eradicated..., July 1,
1975; No smallpox...,
July 1, 1975;
Smallpox..., July 1,
1975).
14 See, for instance,
Memorandum...,
c. Aug. 1975.
in the sub-continent, Indira Gandhi’s firm intervention ensured
that they were forced to support efforts to contain the outbreak
and carry out detailed searches of surrounding areas. In this regard,
the role played by Sharan Singh, Bihar’s Chief Secretary was very
important. He kept pressuring branches of the state administration
and the Chief Minister and helped ensure the deployment of
governmental resources for special epidemiological teams, which
were set up in association with the smallpox eradication unit in
New Delhi. Singh also negotiated a political arrangement where
Dr. Larry Brilliant, an American consultant employed by the WHO’s
Searo, was allowed to take over responsibility for coordcoordinating
activity in Pawa Puri. The central government even cleared the
Bihar Military Police to assist these special epidemiological teams;
military personnel helped cordon off affected villages and provided
protection to program staff (Dutta, c.1980, p.9-11).
Notably, the managers of the intensified program kept reminding
the central and state governments, as well as national and
international funding agencies, about the possibility of another
serious smallpox outbreak if their work slackened. The dangers
arising from such potential crises were also underlined; India, it
was frequently pointed out, could very well end up bearing the
stigma of causing the failure of a high profile global eradication
campaign. By all indications, these tactics were very effective.
Funding bodies, like the Tata Industrial Group and Swedish
International Development Agency, renewed their financial
commitment. Surveillance-containment measures elsewhere were
retained as well, generally with active assistance from the
Government of India, which allowed its anti-malaria and family
planning units to be used frequently by the managers of the
smallpox eradication program, most notably to strengthen search
activities in eastern and northeastern  parts of the country.14
Announcement of the so-called ‘smallpox zero status’ followed
soon after; the last indigenous case was reported on May 17, 1975,
from the Katihar district of Bihar (Mahler, Aug. 20, 1975; Brilliant,
Aug. 20, 1975). The news was announced officially by Dr. Karan
Singh, the federal minister of health, on June 30, 1975, and then
widely publicized. The achievement was also celebrated through a
variety of public functions, some coinciding with the country’s
independence day celebrations on the 15th of August 1975. Even
though the managers of the intensified program participated in
these celebrations, they were extremely uncertain privately about
the wisdom of announcing such a ‘victory’ (Gunaratne, July. 1,
1975).15 Henderson and Grasset highlighted the need to push
through the message that the eradication of smallpox in India could
by no means be taken as guaranteed.16 A great deal of effort was
therefore expended by the WHO and the smallpox eradication
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department of the federal health ministry advertising the importance
of continuing detailed countrywide searches through 1976 and
1977. These paid off, but despite Indira Gandhi’s enthusiasm for
this final drive, the Indian administrative services were by no means
united in their support for the retention of an intensified program.
Even at this late stage, when a victory against variola in India had
been confidently announced by the federal authorities, many
officials in New Delhi and the states still believed that the
disappearance of variola was temporary and that the disease would
inevitably reappear, after being re-introduced from Bangladesh or
Africa (Grasset, Feb. 16, 1976).
As it transpired, these fears proved misplaced. It should not be
forgotten that program workers of all ranks worried incessantly
about unearthing a large pocket of smallpox; this anxiety even
caused generous monetary rewards to be offered for the notification
of variola cases and this was followed up by the detailed
investigation of all resultant reports (Brilliant, Dec. 3, 1975). In
any case, managers of the intensified program were able to start
preparing the documentation that was to certify the eradication of
smallpox in India by September 1976 (Henderson, c. Sept. 1976).
This evidence was cross-checked by an independent team of
international workers over the course of several months and India
was certified smallpox free on April 23, 1977.
Concluding comments
The successful outcome of the smallpox eradication program
demanded persistent hard work by a range of Indian and
international officials. The personal sacrifices were often great:
program officials were forced to spend protracted periods of time
away from their families in unfamiliar contexts, and put in
demanding shifts in the field that often led to physical exhaustion
and ill-health. This work was frequently a thankless task, as
workers encountered the hostility not only of those they were
seeking to protect from a dreadful disease, but also that of politicians
and officials. As a result, their experience was often bittersweet:
sometimes extremely frustrating but also greatly gratifying,
especially when certification of eradication was achieved in the face
of overwhelming odds (Grasset, Jun. 30, 1975).
A detailed examination of the experiences of these workers and of
their interactions with different governmental departments and
officials thus presents a nuanced picture of the multi-faceted
smallpox eradication program. This program is sometimes
simplistically presented as a vertically organized campaign that was
imposed on India by powerful industrialized nations. If anything,
Indian administrators accepted the launch of an organized effort
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aimed at expunging variola on their own terms; the campaign was
also run on their terms over several years, despite the best efforts
of certain WHO officials to dictate the design and unfolding of
policy in the sub-continent.
These trends were visible at all levels of administration. The
Prime Minister, the federal health ministry and central government
bureaucracy reminded WHO representatives of their autonomy at
every available opportunity. As a result, WHO was forced to change
its strategic plans for smallpox eradication in the sub-continent
and agree to contribute generously to the setting up of a special
bureaucracy for the purpose. And yet, this did not solve all their
problems. State and district level administrators, keen to demonstrate
their unwillingness to be ordered about by international and New
Delhi-based officers, also provided differing levels of co-operation
to the plans put forward by the smallpox eradication units. As a
result, senior WHO officials remained acutely aware that none of
their goals would be met without political and bureaucratic
assistance from the highest levels of Indian government. It was
recognized that such support was most likely to arise from
supplicatory requests, made through diplomatic initiatives.
It is also important to note that the smallpox eradication program
had variable effects on the running of the health delivery systems
based at the different levels of Indian administration. While it is
undeniable that some dispensary facilities were affected adversely
by the eradication drive, as health personnel were drawn away
from their daily responsibilities, this situation was by no means
common. In fact, accusations that the smallpox eradication program
harmed the provision of local healthcare facilities were frequently
exaggerated and politically motivated. Apart from representing the
annoyance of bureaucrats and politicians doubting the possibility
of eradicating variola, these criticisms were often used to deflect
from the fact that many sub-divisional healthcare facilities were
not as comprehensive as state government officials had claimed in
their reports, publicity materials and election speeches.
The smallpox eradication program thus appears to have
competed far more vigorously for financial resources against other
centrally administered vertical health schemes, like the family
planning campaigns. It is also worth noting, in this regard, that
the managers of the smallpox eradication program considered it
very useful to employ members of local communities on short-term
contracts for special anti-epidemic measures and state-level intensive
surveillance-containment campaigns. These short-term employees
were seen as an invaluable source of locally pertinent information,
as well as useful for introducing teams of touring officials to the
rural communities being targeted. These temporary workers were
also asked to report on the effective working of local medical and
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public health officials, who were expected to notify all rash and
fever cases they encountered during the course of their routine
duties, for further investigation.
To conclude, it is impossible to tell the complete story of a
complex public health program like the smallpox eradication
campaign through published WHO and Indian government
reports, and the celebratory official histories and memoirs of field
workers. Such commentaries usually tend to present an over-
simplified sense of unity of purpose, over-emphasize the
contributions of certain organizations and individuals, and
downplay many of the serious problems bedeviling the campaign.
A careful analysis of unpublished correspondence, on the other
hand, shows us how policies developed at the level of the WHO
HQ and Indian central government had to be re-adapted
continuously to meet local conditions. It also reveals that a range
of workers, of different nationalities and with widely varying
professional qualifications, were responsible for a monumental
triumph that many had thought impossible.
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